Finland 2025

19/01/2025: Finnish media Ilta-Sanomat asked Supo what threat does IS currently pose to Finland security, especially in the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad's downfall on December 8, 2024 and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Shams (HTS) in Syria. According to Supo's reply, even though IS Caliphate collapsed in 2019, the group is still active in Syrian borderlands and the political mayhem resulting from the power vacuum may grant new opportunities to spread terror and violence, unless HTS proves able to fill the void and establish a relevant political order. The main source of concern shared by Supo was the potential impact on the Northern regions controlled by Kurdish authorities were IS fighters and sympathizers are still detained including ten Finns, most of whom are children. Over 80 Finns departed to Syria throughout the 2010's and some brought along 30 children or even conceived new ones in the Caliphate. Most were repatriated but neither the fighters, nor the mere sympathizers, were prosecuted for the crimes committed in Syria and their involvement in a terrorist organization upon their return to Finland. (Source) 

24/01/2025: Consul Jussi Tanner who serves as special envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of repatriating the Finnish children of foreign fighters and sympathizers affiliated to IS who are still detained in Northern Syria, expressed concerns over the security situation that may result from the new Government formed by HTS that does not tolerate the role of Kurdish authorities in the Northern provinces especially in the al-Hol and al-Roj camps where thousands of people, mostly children and their mothers, are detained. Around 40,000 people are located in the al-Hol camp including ten Finns who are being held in a separate, closed zone with other third-country Nationals according to Tanner. However, their relocation to unspecified areas of Syria is already under process and it has not been confirmed if this will be implemented in cooperation with the new authorities of Damascus, hence the security risk that is being stressed by Tanner. The last repatriation to Finland took place in May 2024 with American and Koweiti contributions, and the remainder of the Finnish detainees rejected any assistance from Finnish auhorities. (Source)

28/01/2025: The District Court declared dead a Finnish man from Pirkanmaa who was reported missing in the spring of 2018 when he was under 30-year-old. He converted at the age of 15 to Islam and disappeared from his family for the first time in 2014. At first, he announced that he was going on a vacation to the cottage, but had disappeared without his family knowing for ten days. In September 2014, he had booked a trip to Istanbul, via Paris, and joined the ranks of IS but he still kept in touch with his family from November 2014 to January 2017 on a streaming website. When a close relative contacted the police again in the spring of 2018, nothing had been heard from the man for over a year. His family felt that he could possible have died since the end of 2017 and no information has been received about the missing man since then. The five-year waiting period to be observed when declaring someone dead had already expired so the District Court ultimately declared the man dead. (Source)

04/03/2025: Supo published its National Security Review for 2025. Interestingly, the previous three-level scale was reshaped into a new more flexible one that allows smaller changes to be taken into account in the threat assessment. Henceforth, Finland has a five-level scale and the current threat on this new scale is level three, or elevated which represents a slight increase compared to the previous level. According to Supo, several simultaneous negative developments have occurred in the international security situation and are also influencing the threat of terrorism in Finland. Negative developments include conflicts in the Middle East, ISIS networks operating in Europe, international Far-Right networks, and the radicalization of minors online. The latter was reported as a key international trend. It is also obvious in Finland, both in the Islamist and Far-Right ecosystems. Islamist activity in Finland still focuses mainly on supporting international terrorism, such as spreading and producing propaganda, financing terrorism, and growing support networks.

The most likely Islamist terrorist attack in Finland would involve simple tools and occur in a public place. Radical Islamist propaganda encourages violence against groups perceived as hostile to Islam, including Christians, Jews, Israel, and sexual minorities. Although terrorist organizations continue to target Western countries, a large-scale attack in Finland is unlikely. Islamist activity in Finland mainly supports international terrorism through propaganda, financing, and growing support networks. Recent international developments have increased the threat of Islamist terrorism against Finland. The desecration of the Quran and escalating Middle Eastern conflicts have intensified radicalization in Europe, contributing to an increase in terrorist attacks and foiled attack plans. IS and its Afghanistan branch (ISKP) have become more active in Europe, with particular involvement from Central Asian and Caucasian radical Islamists. Finland's Security Police (KRP) is investigating IS-related activities with support from intelligence gathered by the Security Police.

The biggest global terrorist threats remain IS, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, which continue to encourage attacks on Western countries. These groups primarily operate in unstable regions of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, attempting to recruit foreign fighters. In Iraq and Syria, IS has continued its operations and tried to inspire attacks in Europe. The rise of HTS in Syria is likely to expand IS' operational freedom in the region, with broader impacts over time. There are still around 50 individuals from Finland in the conflict zones, though most are presumed dead. The threat of other terrorism in Finland remains low. (Source)

28/03/2025: The Finnish National Criminal Police reported that it has almost completed its preliminary investigation into two Finnish women who returned from al-Hol camp. Both are suspected of aggravated human trafficking. One of the women is "Sanna" who returned to Finland in December 2020 while the other one referred to as "Doris" from Vantaa reportedly returned in December 2021. The victims of the crimes are the women's children. Both women traveled to the conflict zone in Syria with their minor children. Although Sanna managed to come back to Finland along with all of her four children, two of Doris' children died in Syria and the remaining two others joined their mother back to Finland. One of them was the young man who was repatriated to Finland in May 2024 after spending six years in a Kurdish detention center. Should the investigation process be successfully completed and charges ultimately considered against both women, this will be the first case of prosecution in Finland against IS returnees, something that the country never implemented before which triggered much criticism back in September 2023. Aggravated human trafficking can result in a prison sentence of 2–10 years according to Finnish Law. (Source)  

31/05/2025: Finnish Supo has for the first time, accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of espionage on its soil, adding it to Russia and China as direct security concerns. Supo said Iran targets dissidents in Finland’s diaspora by gathering personal data, exerting pressure through threats to families, and sometimes using criminal networks as it has already been implemented in Sweden and Denmark. Historian Mikko Porvali warned such operations can escalate to violence, as seen in other parts of Europe. The announcement follows a UK counter-terror operation linked to Iran and reflects growing boldness in Tehran’s activities. While Finland maintains diplomatic ties with Iran, authorities stress the main concern is the risk of Iran-backed violence against opposition figures in the country. Danish PET publicly and officialy charged Iran with indulging in the same subversive activities on its soil in July 2025, especially after the foiled attack on Israeli embassy in Copenhagen back in October 2024 attempted by criminal agents dispatched from Sweden. (Source)

01/09/2025: The Finnish Financial Intelligence Unit published a comprehensive report analyzing suspicious transaction reports between 2020 and 2025 that indicated possible links to terrorist financing. In total, 984 reports were examined, of which 190 were specifically categorized as terrorism-related. Most reports originated from banks, with a smaller but significant share from payment institutions and fintech operators. International financial flows were central to the findings. Funds linked to terrorist financing frequently involved cross-border transactions connected not only to European countries but also to North and East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Türkiye continued to appear as a major transit country for funds directed towards conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq. Other recurrent links included Somalia, Pakistan, and Iraq, countries where Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab, IS, and affiliated networks remain active. The individuals connected to these reports were mostly men aged 20–50, with nationalities including Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, and Türkiye, countries that have been hotspots of Islamist extremist activity. About 30% had positions in companies or non-profit organizations, suggesting that both businesses and NPOs can serve as channels for fundraising or layering. NPOs in particular often presented themselves as religious, cultural, or humanitarian organizations but were suspected of directing funds towards Islamist causes.

Fundraising methods frequently mimicked legitimate charitable activity. Donations were collected under the guise of humanitarian relief through NPOs, crowdfunding campaigns, and personal contributions. Islamist extremist networks have historically exploited charitable giving to support conflicts abroad, and the report confirms that such patterns persisted. In some cases, salaries, business profits, social benefits, and loans were redirected toward suspicious transactions, sometimes linked to fraud or tax evasion. Vehicles purchased with loans were occasionally smuggled out of the country, potentially towards conflict zones. Funds recycling and transfers often relied on money mules, rapid circulation of funds across multiple accounts, and the use of relatives’ accounts, sometimes even those of minors. Cash played an important role, whether through suspicious withdrawals, deposits, or physical couriering abroad. The report highlights the relevance of the hawala system, an informal value transfer method widely used in regions such as the Middle East, Somalia, and Pakistan, and known to be exploited by Islamist groups. New technologies, especially cryptocurrencies, have become increasingly important in terrorist financing. Cryptocurrencies are particularly prominent in transfers to conflict zones and neighboring countries, with Europol reporting that they now operate alongside traditional cash couriering and hawala systems. Islamist movements have been early adopters of these tools, using social media and online platforms to raise and move money discreetly.

The report distinguishes between two financing models. Operational financing typically involves small-scale, self-funded activities by individuals or cells preparing attacks in Europe, often inspired by Islamist ideology. Organizational financing, in contrast, supports the infrastructure of groups abroad, funding recruitment, training, and propaganda. The latter relies heavily on international transfers and the blending of traditional practices—such as charity abuse and hawala with modern tools like crowdfunding and crypto. In conclusion, the report portrays Islamist terrorist financing as a hybrid phenomenon: while many of its methods remain unchanged (charity abuse, cash couriering, hawala) the increasing use of new technologies significantly complicates detection. Islamist networks pragmatically combine old and new techniques, ensuring resilience and adaptability in financing both local and international operations. (Source)

11/09/2025: Considering the increasingly deteriorating security context in the Nordics in the past few years, the Finnish Government submitted a report to the Parliament stressing the need for Finland to draft and enact a new separate law on combating organized crime. This move is a clear sign that Finnish authorities take into consideration the latest developments in Sweden and Denmark that are currently facing security issues related to criminal networks recruiting young offenders to commit acts of violence and even terrorism on behalf on foreign powers such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Minister of the Interior Mari Rantanen, Finland's internal security is generally stable, yet organized crime is growing and internationalizing, which is why legislation also needs to be updated. As such, Finland plans to introduce a new system of criminal intelligence regulation to better address gang and organized crime. Authorities will gain expanded powers to detect and respond to cyber threats, hybrid influence activities, and espionage, including the right to intervene in foreign-based networks that threaten National security. The Finnish Border Guard’s role in supporting civilian intelligence will be clarified, refugee espionage will be criminalized, and legislation will be updated to allow broader information-sharing across agencies. Measures also include stronger powers against the misuse of drones, reforms of criminal procedure to improve efficiency, and new laws to prevent abuse of the immigration system. Critical infrastructure protection will be enhanced in line with the EU’s Critical Entities Resilience Directive. Overall, the reforms aim to give authorities more effective tools to respond to an increasingly complex and hostile security environment.

Preventing serious youth and gang crime from gaining ground in Finnish society is defined as a top priority. While most Finnish youths do not engage in crime, violent offenses among young people, especially those under 15, have grown sharply. These crimes are increasingly group-based, premeditated, and often involve humiliation of victims. Police have identified about ten street gangs in Finland, mostly involving young men with immigrant backgrounds. Some gangs are becoming more professional, cooperating with other criminal groups, and recruiting minors under the age of criminal liability. The Government emphasizes early intervention, family support, schools, and multi-professional cooperation, such as the Anchor model, as effective prevention tools. A National Action Plan has been introduced to counter gang crime, including harsher punishments for gangs that exploit children. Managing the threat of violent extremism and terrorism is another priority. Finland’s current threat level is “elevated”, with the main risks coming from small groups or lone actors inspired by Far-Right or Islamist ideologies. Islamist activity in Finland largely involves support functions such as financing, propaganda, and online training and draws inspiration from international conflicts. The Government stresses the importance of proactive intelligence, information-sharing between authorities, and international cooperation. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022–2025 that was designed back in November 2022 provides the framework for preventing radicalization, supporting vulnerable individuals, and maintaining strong intelligence capabilities.

Interestingly, even though the report dedicates a whole part on Finnish security environment framed by foreign powers threats, it focuses only on Russia and China without providing any additional piece of information regarding potential subversive activities carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran that was officially acknowledged as a foreign hostile influence by Supo in May 2025. (Source)