Sweden 2021
18/02/2021: Arrest in Sweden of two women who returned to Borås after spending several years in Syria. They are suspected of war crimes committed between 2014 and 2017. (Source)
25/02/2021: The Government ultimately aproved the deportation of the Quran teacher from Gothenburg who was arrested in September 2020 suspected of promoting violent interpretations of Islam. On October 29, 2020 the Migration Board made a decision on deportation but at the same time ordered that the deportation may not take place until further notice due to obstacles to enforcement. The Quran teacher appealed the decision and requested that the Swedish Migration Board's decision on deportation be overturned. The Migration Court of Appeal found in its decision on December 17, 2020 that the investigation into the case shows that there are grounds for deportation. (Source)
08/03/2021: The Lund District Court in Sweden sentenced a woman arrested in November 2020 upon her return from Syria to four years in prison. Converted to Islam, she had kidnapped her 2-year-old son to go with him to Syria in order, according to her, to experiment directly the life under the Caliphate rule. However, she was unable to justify the publication on her Facebook page of photos of automatic weapons that she held as well as the glorification of the lifestyle of Islamic State fighters in which she indulged. She was also accused of having made his child live in an environment marked by a Salafist-Jihadist culture of violence and literal application of Sharia law. (Source)
19/03/2021: Swedish authorities have published the Swedish Security Service Yearbook 2020 summarizing the threats looming over Sweden and the assessment of their potential nuisance. The report concludes that Sweden’s security environment in 2020 was increasingly complex, with hostile State activities, violent extremism, terrorism, and cyber threats all posing serious challenges. Säpo stresses that Sweden is both an attractive target for foreign powers and vulnerable to extremist networks that exploit political polarization, globalization, and digitalization. Hostile States such as Russia, China, and Iran represent the most serious intelligence threat to Sweden. They target research, technology, political decision-making, and dissident communities. Their activities include espionage, cyber-attacks, industrial theft, influence operations, and even State-sanctioned violence such as assassination attempts on dissidents in Sweden. Säpo warns that foreign acquisitions and investments may be used to undermine Sweden’s independence and competitiveness, while cyber espionage is estimated to cause losses of billions of kronor annually.
Säpo assesses that Islamist continues to represent the most entrenched terrorist threat in Sweden. Although the overall terrorist threat level in Sweden was classified as “elevated” in 2020, meaning that an attack could occur, Säpo stresses that the primary danger stems from individuals or small groups inspired by Islamist ideology. These actors often draw inspiration from international organizations such as IS and Al-Qaeda. The report explains that hundreds of individuals in Sweden are linked to Islamist extremist environments. Many of these people maintain connections to international networks in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Between 2012 and 2017, approximately 360 individuals from Sweden traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS. While this flow of foreign terrorist fighters has ceased, the presence of returnees and their families continues to create security risks, both in terms of radicalization and terrorist financing. The report emphasizes that the most likely form of attack in Sweden involves lone actors inspired by Islamist propaganda who may use knives, vehicles, or simple homemade weapons. While large-scale, centrally coordinated attacks are assessed as less likely, the presence of radicalized individuals with access to extremist material means that the risk of violence persists. Säpo deems that extremist environments in Sweden are international in scope and are sustained by support activities such as financing, propaganda, and recruitment. Islamist networks in particular maintain links to conflict zones and rely on small-scale fundraising through informal transfer systems and non-profit organizations. Even limited sums of money raised in Sweden can significantly support terrorist operations abroad. The misuse of charities and public funds is noted as a continuing vulnerability.
The report also underlines the risks posed by increasing societal polarization, which expands the space for extremist environments to operate. Subversive activities such as threats, harassment, and violence against politicians, journalists, and public officials undermine democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic has been exploited in extremist propaganda, further fueling recruitment and radicalization. To counter these threats, Säpo has intensified intelligence work, protective security, and cooperation with national and international partners. New measures include closing schools linked to radicalization, restricting the activities of individuals posing threats, and enhancing oversight of extremist-linked financial flows. The establishment of a National Centre for Cyber Security in 2020 is presented as a key step in strengthening resilience against hostile State and extremist threats in the digital domain. The report concludes that Sweden’s democracy, sovereignty, and prosperity are at risk from both hostile States and extremist movements. It calls for stronger protective security, better awareness across society, and a long-term commitment to counter terrorism and extremist financing. Säpo stresses that the most important incidents are those that never happen, and prevention remains its central mission.(Source)
30/03/2021: Ahmed Abdulkarim Ahmed Ahmed, the 51-year-old imam who was held in custody since May 8, 2020, and previously detained on suspicion of terrorist recruitment, will ultimately be deported from Sweden. The government recently made the final deportation decision after Säpo applied for his deportation on grounds of national security. Ahmed's previous appeal was rejected on February 4, 2021. A number of people from the radical Islamist environment are expressing their support for Ahmed's family on a Facebook page. It is also implied that a Syrian returnee lived at Ahmed's home address. (Source)
06/04/2021: Swedish authorities have arrested a couple on suspicion of “conspiracy to commit a criminal terrorist act” against opponents to the Islamic Republic of Iran and American citizens living in Sweden. The two suspects named Fereshteh Sanai-Fari and Mehdi Ramezani entered Sweden as Afghani refugees back in 2015 with no valid IDs to support their claims and were eventually granted asylum. But it turned out during the investigations that they lied about their nationality and age and actually come from Iran as foreign agents. They managed to live undercover for years before catching the interest of authorities in January 2021 when they allegedly started to planning to carry out an attack. (Source)
29/05/2021: Säpo conducted a police operation in an apartment building in Sollentuna and made findings that are linked to terrorism related to IS. The case concerned suspected fraud and a 35-year-old man, who was until recently a board member of a company in the restaurant industry, has been arrested. (Source)
31/05/2021: Sweden Ministry of Finance published the Stärkta åtgärder mot penningtvätt och finansiering av terrorism (“Strengthened Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”) report that assesses Sweden’s vulnerabilities to financial crime and outlines reforms needed to improve the national system for combating both money laundering and terrorist financing. The investigation concludes that while Sweden has made progress in recent years, the country still faces structural weaknesses that expose it to significant risks, especially in relation to international extremist movements. By 2020, Sweden had around 300 individuals assessed as having connections to violent Islamist extremism with financing or logistical support roles. The report stresses that terrorist financing in Sweden does not require large sums of money. Even small transactions can be sufficient to enable radicalization, recruitment, and attacks. Authorities point out that Sweden’s advanced and open financial system, combined with its international migration patterns and links to conflict zones, creates vulnerabilities that extremist groups exploit. The report emphasizes that Islamist extremism represents the most substantial terrorist financing threat in Sweden. Authorities note that individuals and networks connected to IS, Al-Qaeda, and associated organizations have made use of Sweden’s financial channels to raise and transfer money. In particular, flows to and from conflict regions such as Syria, Iraq, and Somalia have been detected, with Türkiye frequently serving as a transit country. The financing associated with Islamist extremism is generally directed abroad rather than spent on domestic attacks. Funds collected in Sweden have supported international organizations or local affiliates in conflict areas. The most common mechanisms include misuse of charitable organizations, informal transfer systems such as hawala, and direct remittances through family or community ties.
One of the main vulnerabilities in the Swedish system lies in the non-profit sector. The report highlights that religious and humanitarian organizations have occasionally been exploited to channel money to extremist actors. Sweden has over 250,000 registered associations, and about 50,000 are active NPOs. Although many associations operate legitimately, weak oversight has allowed certain groups to divert donations under the cover of humanitarian relief. The authorities underline that the difficulty in distinguishing legitimate aid from terrorist financing makes this a critical risk area. The hawala system continues to play a central role in moving money to regions where Islamist extremist groups are active. This system is deeply embedded in certain diaspora communities and functions outside regulated financial channels. Cash transactions also remain significant, both for fundraising inside Sweden and for cross-border transfers. Criminal networks with links to Islamist actors have sometimes combined traditional organized crime revenues, such as fraud or drug trafficking, with terrorist financing flows. Although cash transactions in Sweden represent less than 10% of total payments in the economy, yet cash still features prominently in suspected terrorist financing cases, particularly in connection with hawala and informal transfers to conflict zones. The report notes with concern the increasing use of cryptocurrencies and online platforms in terrorist financing. Islamist movements worldwide have adopted digital tools for fundraising and money transfers, and Sweden is not immune to these developments. Monitoring capacity within both the financial sector and supervisory authorities needs to be strengthened to keep pace with these evolving methods.
A further risk relates to the 360 Swedes who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS during the height of the conflict. While the flow has largely ended, returnees and their families still represent a potential source of radicalization and financing activity. Some individuals maintain transnational connections that could facilitate fundraising or support for extremist causes abroad. The report also considers Far-Right extremism and other ideologies, but concludes that their financing is far less structured and involves smaller sums than Islamist extremist financing. Islamist extremism is therefore regarded as the primary terrorist financing threat to Sweden.
The conclusions of the investigation carry clear implications for the Swedish financial sector. Institutions are expected to apply stricter due diligence measures to non-profit organizations, remittance services, and clients with ties to high-risk jurisdictions. Transaction monitoring must take into account patterns such as repeated small transfers, rapid circulation of funds through multiple accounts, and the involvement of family members’ accounts. Banks and financial institutions are also urged to develop technical capabilities for monitoring cryptocurrency flows, which are increasingly exploited by Islamist networks. The report concludes that Sweden must reinforce its national system to effectively counter terrorist financing. Islamist extremist networks remain the primary concern, and their financing methods combine traditional tools such as charity abuse, cash couriering, and hawala with newer digital instruments like cryptocurrencies. Even though the financial volumes are modest, the consequences are disproportionate because these resources sustain international terrorist organizations and their capacity for propaganda, recruitment, and violent action. (Source)
06/09/2021: 3 Swedish women who joined IS and who spent several years in detention in Syrian territories controlled by the Kurdish authorities were deported to Sweden and arrested upon their arrival. (Source)
Although Swedish authorities cannot release confidential and specific information about people who settled in IS territory and returned, a media source said one of the women allegedly faces charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. (Source)
21/10/2021: Three women and eight children, three of whom are orphans, have arrived in Sweden after being expelled by the self-governing authorities in Northeastern Syria. The women were arrested by police at Arlanda and are suspected of war crimes. The children have been taken into care by social services. The women were thereafter released on October 23, as Swedish prosecutors deemed there was no longer any reason to detain them yet the investigations are still ongoing. (Source)
27/10/2021: The Swedish School Inspectorate revoked the license of Römosseskolan, which operated three Islamic schools in Gothenburg, after the Somali-born headmaster, Abdirizak Waberi was charged with fraudulent monetary activities. Römosseskolan has been granted over 400 tax million in school money over the past ten years yet 12 million were embezzled to two companies owned by Waberi who used the public funds he received to purchase sex clubs in Thailand. Moreover, he sent large sums to Somalia where he runs an Islamist party, the National Unity Party that in touch with the the Islamist Milli Göruz and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). As a prominent advocate of Islamic education, Waberi held high positions within MB-related organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), which is the main Muslim Brotherhood organization in Europe. He also served as chairman of the Islamic Association in Sweden, the Muslim Political Forum and the Islamic Schools of Sweden, is also a member of the board of the Muslim Council of Sweden (Sveriges Muslimska Råd, SMR), which is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood through the FIOE. Despite the close ties of Waberi with the European Islamist milieu, authorities were not able to prove that his school is involved in extremism and violent radicalization but rather focused on his devious financial practices. (Source)
19/11/2021: Islamist activist Raad Al-Duhan who has been charged with aggravated money laundering on June 1, 2021, was sentenced by the Gävle District Court to a suspended sentence and a daily fine of 5,000 kronor. He received money through a sports club in Gävle that he manages himself and then bought foreign currency. The total amount involved is 465,000 kronor. Al-Duhan was arrested in June 2019 in an operation by Säpo, and is considered to pose a threat to national security, hence the decision in October 2019 to expel him from Sweden alongside his father Abo Raad, former controversial imam at the Gävle mosque. He is also notorious for making death threats against Anna Gullberg, then editor-in-chief of Gävle Dagblad. According to Säpo, he had contributed to the growth of violent extremist environments by being influential in activities where radicalization occurs. However, he remains in Sweden as he faces risks of persecution in his home country, Iraq. (Source)
03/12/2021: The Riksdag approved a clearer terrorism Law that will amend and supplement the criminal provisions for terrorist crimes. According to the new Law, it is therefore a criminal offense to perform a task that is directly linked to the criminal activities of a terrorist group and to publicly incite to commit terrorist crimes. (Source)